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In the wake of the general trend towards privatisa-
tion and deregulation in the last few years, public
employment services have also been privatised in
various OECD countries. After the OECD promot-
ed privatisation in their “Jobs Study” of 1994 as a
means to increase efficiency, Australia, in 1998,
replaced its public employment service with a pri-
vate “Job Network” of approximately 200 firms.
Placement contracts were awarded to these compa-
nies in a tendering procedure. Performance is remu-
nerated with state premiums based on placements
(Lundsgaard 2002, 109; OECD 2001). In 2000 the
Netherlands followed Australia’s example – to name
the two most important countries (de Koning 2004).
In addition to matching job-seekers with vacancies,
counceling etc., hiring out of the unemployed can
also be a means of procuring a permanent job. In
Germany the placement-oriented hiring-out by
private firms has been used since 1994, in particu-
lar since the implementation of the Hartz
Commission’ proposals by the federal government
in 2003, as an instrument of labour-market policy.
In order to ensure efficiency, private hiring-out is
regulated and promoted in a way that has not been
previously tried anywhere. In addition to a tender-
ing procedure to select temporary work agencies, a
degressive lump-sum per case and placement pre-
miums are paid by the government for their ser-
vices.The question arises as to whether the regula-
tions and incentives selected lead to an efficient
placement of the unemployed in regular employ-
ment.As initial results are now available, it is pos-
sible to make a provisional evaluation.
Private temporary work agencies and the public
authorities’ interest in placement 
Inefficiencies that arise when public authorities
hire out the unemployed can be counteracted –
aside from internal administrative organisational
and structural reforms – by having private tempo-
rary work agencies hire out the unemployed in a
competitive market. Temporary work agencies
endeavour to provide appropriate information with
respect to the availability and quality of positions
and applicants to those looking for work as well as
to (potential) hiring-in firms. They bring together
job offers and job seekers and thereby increase the
matching efficiency. Competition between agencies
contributes to increased efficiency.
The placement results of private temporary work
agencies, however, can hardly satisfy the public
authorities in times of high unemployment. There
are, in particular, three reasons that have induced
the labour office to exercise influence on the
behaviour of private temporary work agencies in
the form of regulations and financial incentives:
• From the point of view of hiring-in firms, the
attractiveness of hiring-in depends largely on
the fees they have to pay. In Germany experi-
ence has shown that temporary work agencies
calculate twice the gross salary of their workers.
With better-qualified workers the fee is some-
what higher, with less qualified workers some-
what lower. A certain demand for agency work
develops with a given level of fees. By providing
state subsidies the fees are reduced, the demand
for agency work rises and thus the chances for
final placement of the unemployed in the hiring-
in firms are increased.
• In addition to the hiring fees, it is the quality of
the offer that makes hiring-in attractive. As a
result of market failure the quality can be quite
low. Market failure exists if when placing a
worker there is an information gap with respect
to the quality of placement between the tempo-
rary work agency and the customer.This is like-
ly to happen quite often,as the hiring-in compa-
ny is only able to determine in the course of the
working relationship whether the work agency
has chosen and hired out a worker who meets
his expectations. But if one market side has an
information lead and thus a strategic advantage,
the quality of the offer can deteriorate, as was
shown by Akerlof,for example,in the used auto-
mobile market. A reduction in demand for
agency work is the result, and temporary work
agencies experience a loss of reputation. Such a
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Economic Research at the University of Munich.development can be counteracted on the part of
the temporary work agencies by self-regulation
and building up a reputation (for example, in
the form of quality seals).The state,on the other
hand, can contribute to an increase in quality by
establishing regulations for professional prac-
tice, by requiring licenses for private temporary
work agencies or by selecting suitable agencies
through tendering (Konle-Seidl 2002).
• In addition to the expansion of agency work, pub-
lic authorities are particularly interested in final
placement of the unemployed in the hiring-in
firms. This, however, is not a goal followed by pri-
vate temporary work agencies.They are not inter-
ested in their manpower being hired away. They
prefer relatively short working periods in the hir-
ing-in firms and thus hinder permanent placement.
They also do not invest sufficiently in handling and
qualifying their workers and do not keep up the
contact needed for successfully integrating them in
the hiring-in firms (Schröder 1997, 299).
Furthermore, as they recruit only 30 percent of
their employees from the reservoir of registered
unemployed in Germany, they only partially fulfil
the task of finding regular work for the unem-
ployed (Jahn and Rudolph 2002).
In view of the dissatisfying results of private tem-
porary work agencies, from the viewpoint of the
public authorities, their activities have been sup-
plemented since 2003 by so-called Personal Service
Agencies (PSA), which are regulated and sub-
sidised by the federal government. According to
Art. 37c of the Social Security Code, Third Book
(SGB III), all of the 180 local labour offices are
obligated to set up at least one PSA. Its task is to
hire out workers with a view to integrating them in
the hiring-in firms as well as to provide further
training for staff in work-free periods. The PSA
contracts are tendered for in public competitions.
The number and professional make-up of the PSA
employees is determined largely by the local
labour office and is described in the invitation to
tender.The activities of the PSA are subsidised.
The tendering procedure
The tendering procedures involve the discre-
tionary awards of PSA contracts by local labour
offices according to the German regulations gov-
erning invitations to tender. The procedure
involves three stages.
The pre-selection of agencies begins with an invi-
tation to tender published in the Bundesausschrei-
bungsblatt (Federal Register) and in the press.
Based on this description, interested parties may
submit applications to participate in the competi-
tion to the local labour offices. They must prove
their reliability. Furthermore, they must also show
evidence of their experience in commercial or non-
profit hiring-out, private job search assistance or
their involvement in active labour market policies.
Having carried out such an activity in the last
twelve months is sufficient proof. Lastly they must
provide evidence of their performance. In general,
this requirement is fulfilled if a private temporary
work agency has employed at least 30 agency
workers in the last twelve months. From the list of
applicants the labour office selects suitable candi-
dates, who are then given the opportunity to sub-
mit a tender.
The tender must include an offer with a basic fee
(see below) as well as a detailed concept for the
PSA, which clearly shows the quality of the compet-
ing tender. This concept must include specifics con-
cerning the personnel and structure of the planned
PSA, the collective agreement to be used, the strate-
gy for acquiring contracts, the expected extent and
use of work-free periods, as well as the achievable
integration/placement rate, which can be used as a
measure of success when deciding on contract exten-
sion. The offers are evaluated according to criteria
connected with price and quality. It is thus a kind of
beauty contest.The tender price is given a weight of
60 percent,the quality of the offer based on the PSA
concept 40 percent. The PSA concept is summarily
evaluated on a scale between one and ten.The joint
evaluation of the tender price and the PSA concept
is based on a formula that reflects the tendering
price of the firm in question and that of the lowest
offer as well as the quality points received for the
firm in question and that of the company with the
highest quality rating.
After the evaluation has been completed, the labour
office negotiates with up to five bidders who have
submitted the most economical offers. Finally a con-
tract, which is usually limited to 24 months, is signed
with one of the bidding companies.
This awarding procedure has advantages and dis-
advantages. By setting up a qualifying competition
in advance,the number of bids and thus the variety
of bids is restricted. Newcomers have a reduced
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chance of participating. On the other hand, a
restricted invitation to tender increases the success
chances of the bidders so that they take greater
care in preparing their bids, which in turn increas-
es the quality. Furthermore, restricted tendering
involves cost savings for the businesses as well as
for the labour offices, as they have fewer bids to
prepare or evaluate, respectively.
Different criteria are used for the evaluation of the
applicants and the bidders. In the qualifying com-
petition, criteria are used that evaluate the charac-
teristics of the companies (reliability, expertise,
performance) and determine their basic suitability
as a PSA. The standards for the selection in the
tendering procedure are process criteria that char-
acterize the intended behaviour of the PSA as well
as the expected placement rate (for more on the
criteria, see Dykstra and de Koning 2002). Too lit-
tle weight is placed on criteria that indicate the
success the bidding firms had in the past of finding
permanent work for the unemployed.
The evaluation of the applications and the bids is
based on criteria that are not always clearly formu-
lated and in some cases are not measurable. Price
and quality of the offers are evaluated together,
using a formula in a relationship of 60 to 40.
Experience so far, especially the bankruptcy of the
firm Maatwerk, makes it advisable to place more
weight on the quality of the bids. The awarding of
points for the quality of the PSA concept is based
on the subjective evaluations of the responsible
employees in the local labour offices.Thus the bid-
ders do not know what standards are used to eval-
uate the individual parts of their PSA concept.
Size and make-up of target groups
In the tendering procedure it is the task of the
labour offices to determine the number of people
to be employed by the future PSA and the charac-
teristics they have.The goal is to ease the decision
on the part of the firms to participate in the com-
petition and to provide information they need to
calculate their bid. A specific size makes it easier
for the Bundesagentur für Arbeit (Federal
Employment Agency), which is responsible for the
financing of the local labour offices,to estimate the
funds needed for the PSA. It also reduces the costs
for negotiating and thus the transaction costs for
the individual labour offices.
The target groups for the PSA are the unemployed
who are fit to work and have skills suitable for
agency work.The target groups are selected by the
local labour office. Labour offices tend towards a
narrow selection of the target groups based on
occupations characteristics, following their tradi-
tional administrative structure (for example,
unemployed in commercial areas) and to vary this
selection only on the basis of personal characteris-
tics (old/young, well/poorly qualified). A homoge-
nous group of agency workers in occupational
terms will in fact reduce “cherry picking”. On the
other hand, the PSA will not have the flexibility to
react in a suitable manner to differentiated person-
nel demands.This can lead to more work-free peri-
ods for the PSA employees.Temporary work agen-
cies thus argue that the target group should be pro-
fessionally mixed with an emphasis on the com-
mercial-technical professions that are in high
demand. The demand on the part of the PSA to
define the target group more loosely is now being
met by more and more labour offices. As a result
they not only support the temporary work agencies
in their work,but they also make it possible for the
hiring-in firms – at least in larger labour office dis-
tricts – to approach a number of PSAs, each with a
wider range of personnel, instead of having to deal
with only a few specialized PSAs.
The target number of agency workers as agreed
between the local labour offices and the PSA is to
be achieved within three months. Initially the
labour offices pursued this goal energetically,
insisting that those who cannot be hired out be
trained instead. To reduce the cost burden for the
PSA, more and more labour offices have accepted
that the unemployed are only hired by the PSA
when a contract with a hiring-in firm is available.
The future PSA employees are suggested by the
labour office.The PSA has the right to reject appli-
cants. The unemployed are hired by the PSA for a
limited period of nine to twelve months, during
which time they are subject to social insurance
contributions. During this period the PSA employ-
ee is to be hired out and placed in permanent
employment as quickly as possible.
Financial support
Control of the PSA is achieved by subsidies and
premium-oriented incentives. This system is based
on but not identical to suggestions made by theBertelsmann Foundation et al. (2002) and Hartz et
al. (2002). It is meant to prompt the PSA to a rapid
placement of their employees in the regular labour
market.
The PSA receives a monthly lump sum per case
from the labour office and a premium for place-
ment in a regular job.The lump sum and the place-
ment premium are based on the basic fee cited in
the bid.The bidders have calculated this amount so
that the PSA can make a profit but at the same
time have good chances of obtaining a contract.
The basic fee varies according to occupation and
the placement difficulties of the target group as
well as the nature of the regional labour market.
To ensure rapid integration into the regular labour
market, the lump sum and the placement premium
are degressive. The monthly lump sum amounts to
100 percent of the basic fee for the first to third
month of PSA employment,75 percent of the basic
fee for the fourth to sixth month of PSA employ-
ment and 50 percent of the basic fee for the sev-
enth to ninth month of PSA employment. After
nine months the PSA no longer receives a month-
ly lump sum per case.The monthly lump sum is not
paid if the PSA employee is hired in by a previous
employer with whom he held a position subject to
social insurance contributions for more than three
months in the last four years.
The placement premium amounts to 200 percent,
150 percent or 100 percent of the basic fee if the
PSA employee takes on employment during the
first three months, the fourth to the sixth month or
after the sixth month, respectively, with a hiring-in
firm or another firm through the efforts of the
PSA. The premium is paid in two instalments. The
first half is due when a job subject to social insur-
ance contributions for at least three months is
begun and the second half after an employment
period of six months. It is the task of the PSA to
provide documentary proof.
PSA contracts
To document the effectiveness of the PSA as an
active instrument of labour market policy, the
Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA) has published a few
indicators of PSA activities in their labour market
statistics. This information covers the time period
from April 2003 to March 2004. In addition the BA
has developed together with the Institut für
Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB) an eval-
uation system that reports on the activities of the
PSA. In April 2004 this report was not yet accessi-
ble to the public. IAB employees have, however,
manually evaluated the following information for
April to November of 2003 (Jahn and Windsheimer
2004a and 2004b; referred to below as JW).
In March 2004 there were 919 PSAs in Germany
with some 40,000 places for the unemployed (BA).
In October 2003 there were almost 43,000 PSA
places available (JW). With respect to the size of
the target groups from April to November 2003 the
following situation prevailed: in 455 cases, almost
half of all contracts, the number of places to be
filled was between 40 and 60. 32 percent of the
PSAs had a size of between 20 and 40, and around
15 percent of the PSAs were able to employ
between 60 and 80 unemployed. The average size
was 45 (JW). For 41 percent of the contracts the
basic fee was set at between p1,100 and p1,300.
Nearly one-fourth of the PSA contracts stipulated
a basic fee of between p900 and p1,100. In 14 per-
cent of the cases there was a basic fee of between
p700 and p900, and for 13 percent a basic fee of
between p1,300 and p1,500.The average basic fee
amounted to p1,099 (JW).
Performance
In March 2004 PSAs employed just under 27,000
jobless (BA). In October 2003 some 1,000 PSAs
with about 30,000 agency workers were active in
the labour market (JW). It is noticeable that PSA
employees are somewhat better qualified than tra-
ditional agency workers. Nearly 61 percent of the
former had absolved an in-company training pro-
gramme compared to 54 percent of the later. Also
in terms of other socio-economic characteristics
PSAs offer those unemployed a position that have
“normal” placement difficulties (JW). This choice
of personnel runs counter to the goal of the subsi-
dies, namely to promote employment of those with
greater placement obstacles.
Of the average number of those employed by the
PSA from April to October 2003 (14,091), a good
43 percent were hired out. This number is based on
the relationship of actual hiring-out days to the pos-
sible hiring-out days without taking account of non-
working days,such as illness,holiday,etc.(in nomina-
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tor  and denominator; JW). Low figures like this
would strongly endanger the economic viability of
‘normal’ temporary work agencies (Ochel 2003).As
the bankruptcy of Maatwerk at the beginning of
2004 shows, PSAs can not manage low rates either.
The  Bundesagentur für Arbeit does not publish
placement rates in hiring-in firms, only the average
integration rates. These compare the number of
agency workers withdrawing from PSAs and taking
on regular employment subject to social insurance
contributions and that of all withdrawals from the
PSA. The withdrawals and entry into regular
employment include positions with the hiring-in
firms and other firms. Between April 2003 and
March 2004 the integration quota was 31.3 percent;
until February 2004, before the bankruptcy of
Maatwerk was included in the calculation, the fig-
ure was 40.1 percent (Table).
The figures provided by Jahn and Windsheimer are
more detailed.They have the disadvantage,howev-
er,that only the first six months of the PSAs’ activ-
ities have been evaluated – a period in which the
effectiveness of the PSA had not yet been fully
developed. As the Table shows, the integration
quota from April 2003 to October 2003 amounted
to 47.4 percent. Placement in hiring-in firms was,
however, only 11 percent, a figure that is not sur-
prising for the first six months of PSA activities. If
placement refers to those hired out and not to
withdrawals, then the placement rate rises. At
16.3 percent the rate is, however, considerably
lower than the standard 30 percent achieved by
private temporary work agencies in Germany
(Ochel 2003).It is expected that the placement rate
will be considerably higher in the future. The low
placement in hiring-in firms was compensated
partly by the placement of PSA workers in other
firms. 25.1 percent of the exits found regular
employment subject to social insurance contribu-
tions in this manner. Thus, in the beginning phase
the PSA tended to function more as normal place-
ment agencies than as temporary work agencies. In
the end quite a few PSA employees found work
through their own initiative.1
Summary
Since 2003 private temporary work agencies – so-
called Personal Service Agencies – have been
increasingly used as an instrument of labour mar-
ket policy. In each of the 180 German labour office
districts at least one PSA has been set up.They are
regulated and financially supported in a way that is
unknown in other countries.
The PSAs are selected by the individual labour
offices in a discretionary tendering procedure pre-
ceded by an open competition in which candidates
are chosen to participate. This is basically a kind of
“beauty contest”.The bidders have to suggest a basic
fee on which the financial support is based and pre-
sent a concept for the PSA.The labour offices set the
number of workers to be employed by each PSA.
The average target group size for 2003 was 45. The
labour offices also decide on the characteristics of
the unemployed who are employed by the PSA.The
PSAs receive for each unemployed they employ a
degressively declining monthly lump sum and a
placement premium. The sum of both amounts is
based on the basic fee cited in the bid.
Rates of integration and placement for PSA employees, in percent
Exits and entry into regular employment subject to social















Employment subject to social
insurance contributions
-  in hiring-in firms 11.0 16.3
-  in other firms
- placed by PSA
31.3 40.1
25.1
- employee’s own initiative 11.3
Denominator, absolute 29,117 19,141 9,005 6,073
Source:  
a) Bundesagentur für Arbeit (    http://www.pub.arbeitsamt.de/hst/services/statistik/detail/a.html  ).
b) Jahn and Windsheimer 2004b; calculations by CESifo.
1 The 52.6 percent of withdrawals from the PSA for other reasons
have been excluded (JW).Initial results of the PSA activities are now avail-
able for a preliminary evaluation. In March 2004
there were 919 PSAs with approximately 27,000
employees. Contrary to performance expectations
of subsidised agency work, it was primarily the
unemployed with relatively few placement obsta-
cles that were employed by the PSA. This bias
could have to do with the pressure to succeed with
which the PSA as a new instrument of labour mar-
ket policy was introduced. Only 43 percent of the
average number of agency workers were hired out.
The placement rate in hiring-in firms was still quite
low in the beginning phase but should rise in the
future. The effectiveness of the awarding proce-
dure and the financial support of the PSA have, as
yet, not been questioned by the general public in
Germany. An exact evaluation is only possible
when sufficiently detailed information is available
for a longer time period.
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